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There is no single answer that can apply to the whole of humanity as to why we should live longer, why we should be more enhanced, why we should lead any particular kind of life at all, argues Andy Miah. Instead, he urges us to appeal to the idea that people spend their lives trying to accumulate various kinds of capital: we educate ourselves, we undertake physical activity, we develop relationships with each other, and we might also wish to self-modify our bodies because we think that these activities enrich our lives.


Marc Roux: Why are you a proponent of human enhancement?


Andy Miah: When I argue on behalf of human enhancement, I appeal to ideas that would enrich our life, that would lead to greater equality for instance. In doing so, I try to situate discussions about such prospects within a cultural context. So, health is often seen as separate from that, since it is often treated as a good in itself, which we should pursue regardless of our cultural differences. We try to reduce infant mortality, delay age-related diseases and so on. Thus, the health argument goes along these lines: we should use whatever means possible in order to make ourselves healthier, and this is because we disvalue illness or disease. ill-health put us in a situation of pain and suffering and we are sensible to want to avoid that, even if we recognise that there are cases of pain and suffering that might enrich our humanity: the sense of loss when somebody dies, the kind of relationships we develop when injured and so on.


Nevertheless, we believe -and I think rightly so- that a life free from pain, illness and hardship is generally better than a life where we suffer from such experiences. So, this health-based argument tends not to require much qualification, we can make the case without making any reference to cultural circumstances. However, when we look at other dimensions of our lives, when we talk about human enhancements as aesthetic preferences, these arguments do not have the same power. Nevertheless, the situation is more complex than this. Health-related claims are also aesthetic claims: they are claims about which kinds of lives are preferable or worth living.


Let’s imagine a particular example: a modification that could be characterised as an enhancement although it would not improve our functional properties, such as the alteration of our skin colour. Let’s avoid getting into racial categories and instead consider he capacity to transform ourselves bright blue or green, a colour that is not typically seen in human skin. How should we regard such a modification? Is this a legitimate use of our free will to alter ourselves, or would it seem to undermine any dignity for human life?


I think it is entirely reasonable to want to change the colour of one’s skin, in the same sense that it is reasonable to want to change the colour of one’s hair. I make no distinction in terms of the legitimacy or the morality of it, because I consider it as a wonderful expression of our identities.


What concerns me is how often the debate on human enhancement is reduced to present day discussions, about, for instance, the suspicious normative tendencies of cosmetic surgery. The proposition that we ought to make our breasts or our penises larger, so that we conform to a dubious ideal about how we ought to be is clearly concerning, but we are currently very restricted in the ways in which we might modify our bodies. As such, there’s only so much value in appealing to present day practices. What would be valuable is if we enter a world where we can transform the current, narrow lens through which we imagine human enhancements into a much broader set of experiences and aesthetic visions.


This is why I think Oscar Pistorius, as an athlete, as a paralympian, as an ambassador of transhuman technologies, is an appealing case in point. Pistorius has no intention of arguing on behalf of post or trans-humanism. He is just an individual that utilises prosthetic devices to allow him to engage in the practice that we describe as running. Because of his engagement he has seen the illegitimacy of separating athletes with disabilities from so-called able bodied people.


In that role, we are witnessing a radical transformation of what we consider as elite sport. For many years, the world of sport has treated disability sport as second best. Pistorius is now flipping it over. The disabled enhanced athlete is now taking prime position in terms of what we understand as able bodied.


Marc Roux: Can we draw a red line concerning what types of human enhancement are legitimate?


Andy Miah: People talk about a red line as if there might be a moment when we are doing too much. First, we have to interrogate what this red line means. People usually refer to a moral red line: that if we do too much we might lose some valued aspect of our humanity. I don’t think this is likely. I think that the red line should relate to how we regulate technologies, not limit the use of them. Regulation is very complex: it depends on what sorts of technologies we are talking about.


For instance, let’s go back to the case of changing of our skin color and compare it with genetic modification. Let us further imagine that the change of skin color requires merely swallowing or drinking a harmless substance. Alternatively, genetic modification would probably require sophisticated laboratories, a number of scientists and medics that would help us to bring about the change. In these two different cases we have an example that doesn’t require a medical professional help versus one that is heavily reliant on that kind of intervention.


We might say that skin color case doesn’t raise any ethical concerns because it doesn’t engage any other individual whose own interest might be conflicting. With genetic modification it becomes a more complicated story.


Marc Roux: What about the hypothetical example of someone who wants to pass on the green color of his skin to her/his children?


Andy Miah: That is a very good example. Should we distinguish between things that are passed on through our gene core versus things that remain within ourselves? I think it is reasonable to prefer to not pass on genetic dysfunctions, which would lead to lives of severe suffering. Examples of this are the discussions around mitochondrial DNA, where we try to remove the mitochondrial DNA from an egg, in order to prevent an individual from facing remarkable degrees of suffering after his/her birth. In this case, however, we are transgressing some norms: a child that is born from an egg that has undergone mitochondrial DNA transfer is effectively a child with three direct genetic parents, with DNA from three individuals.


We are not yet on the point of doing that, but we certainly embrace the principle of the technology. In addition, we make self-selective choices about how we procreate and what sorts of cultural baggage we bring to that discussion, we make plans in our lives that are implicit ways of deciding what kind of next people are brought into this world.


We are relatively well disposed to thinking to about passing on genetic material to future generations. The concern seems to be for many people irreversibility.


Marc Roux: What do you think about the idea that at the moment when we engage with a new technology we have changed already?


Andy Miah: In most of my writings, I describe the human condition as a relationship between nature and technology. This interpretation of our humanity relies on the idea that we appropriate technologies, making them part of our being. We do this in all sorts of ways, from how we use a mobile phone or a computer to how we drive our cars. There are certain ways in which a car is to be driven, but we don’t necessarily follow those rules or do what is in the best interest of the car’s health. I think we are absolutely changed by technological encounters and this begins at our conception of the technology. This is where the relationship begins. If you think about most works of science fiction, they infiltrate our technological imagination and this has an effect on how we think about this relationship.


Marc Roux: What do you think of the idea that human consciousness can be seen as the main universal principle that might draw the red line concerning the uses of technologies?


Andy Miah: I have difficulties with this notion. How does this make sense in the context of trying to discern the moral status of an embryo, for instance? Because there are different views on when life begins, even if we can recognize something like a universal consciousness, a brain doesn’t exist when the primitive streak begins, so it is difficult to talk about that life as having a conscious value that we can articulate.


Marc Roux: But, for us as conscious beings I wonder whether only life is essential. What if consciousness can be most important feature of the human condition?


Andy Miah: Are you suggesting that the limit of our morality surrounding human enhancement has to do with maintaining consciousness?


Marc Roux: Yes. If we are looking for a positive reason for human enhancement, what would this be? Why do we want to live longer, enhanced lives?


Andy Miah: This is where it comes back down to a new concept I am using to describe the imperative: the accumulation of biocultural capital. There is no single answer that can apply to the whole of humanity as to why we should live longer, why we should be more enhanced, why we should lead any particular kind of life at all. However, these are also unnecessary justifications. We can’t even agree on fundamental human freedoms or rights. To expect, a universal answer on human enhancement is beyond the requirements of our debate. Instead, we can appeal to the idea that people spend their lives trying to accumulate various kinds of capital: we try to make money sure, but there are other kinds of capital. We educate ourselves, we undertake physical activity, we develop relationships with each other, and we try to do all these things because we think that they enrich our lives. Similarly, we ride motorcycles or dance just to have fun and be closer to our humanity. People will talk about these activities as if the authentic human condition is exhibited in those moments of extreme performance. It is the same with biocultural capital, where our self-modifications become part of what gives our lives value.


Marc Roux: Why do these performances attract us so much? And not only this…Why do we want to have children? Why do we want to be Napoleon?


Andy Miah: My approach is to allow people to explore these dimensions of human experience, to be critical of certain normative trends, for example if we see certain patterns of human enhancement that are based around strong corporate interests that are ultimately limiting people’s freedoms rather than opening them up. But, it also comes down to the question that if, I do want to be taller, then why not? Or, if I want to be shorter or thinner…


Generally, the justification for cosmetic surgery is on the basis of whether one feels that it would improve her/his quality of life. There will be all sorts of concerns about communities of enhancement addiction that might arise from this. Society should be concerned about these issues, but this doesn’t allow society to restrict those freedoms. We ultimately should be empowered to make these choices and society’s role is to critically engage us with the implications of those choices, not to tell us not to do it.

Special issue: read also, transhumanism
Tags: Andy Miah, bioethics, biotechnology, liberalism, transhumanism

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1. Ο/Η Miles to go before I sleep…. » Blog Archive » Re-Public: Transhumanism? (deel 2) :
   June 24th, 2009 at 13:40

   [...] Andy Miah – Human enhancement and the accumulation of biocultural capital [...]

   
   

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