René Cuperus – The pitfalls of multiculturalism

The biggest challenge for European social democracy is populism, populism from the right or even extreme right, and populism from the left. European social democracy must be tough on populism and tough on the causes of populism. The example of the Netherlands shows that there is price to pay if we are to effectively face populism: the abandonnement of the concept of the multicultural society. That’s a hard choice to make, but I think that the concept of multiculturalism has caused a lot of harm and confusion, both for migrants and for the citizens of the host country.

The biggest risk for contemporary social democracy is the breakdown of the social-democratic parties, the split of these parties in two constituencies under the attack by populism.

What is at stake is the fragmentation of the social democratic electorate into two camps: a cleavage between social liberal academic professionals and traditional trade union-social democrats; the cleavage between higher educated and lower educated, between cosmopolitan and nationalistic or libertarian and authoritarian orientations. This split represents the fragmentation within European middle class society at large which is the result of the strong forces of globalization, mass migration, individualization and the postindustrial knowledge based economy.

The problems of the center parties are a pars pro toto, a mirror of this situation; The pressures of division and fragmentation on the social democratic parties are the pressures within society. A possible cleavage or split of European social democracy may be a foreshadowing of the aforementioned social split. What is fundamentally under attack is social cohesion and solidarity, which are the foundations and pillars of European social democracy. Social democracy here is defined as the coalition, the connector between privileged and underprivileged, between lower and higher middle class. So, the big challenge for contemporary social democracy then is to prevent the exodus of die letzte Arbeiter aus die Arbeiterparteien, under the strong threat from populism, left-wing and right wing.

The biggest challenge for European social democracy is populism, populism from the right or even extreme right, and populism from the left. European social democracy must be tough on populism and tough on the causes of populism. Populism is a concept with a Janus-head. Populism is a dangerous political species; referring even to the black past of European history. Populism in Europe, unlike the American tradition of populism, is more or less associated with fascism and Nazism, the pathologies of the ‘’voice of the masses’’.

But populism, and that’s the other side of the coin, can also be, a legitimate warning against technocratic policy making, against the bias of the academic middle class in the world of politics, against new inequalities, and the failures of representative democracy. In this sense of the word, populism must never be demonized and underestimated.

Populism might act as an alarm signal which points towards an existing or forthcoming crisis. Such crises could be a crisis of representation and/or a communication breakdown between elites and ordinary people realized as a popular revolt of distrust and discontent. Indeed, populism is the nightmare for moderate center-left reform politics, for the political coalition between the low-skilled and high skilled, the low educated and high educated.

Populism is a deep, fundamental reaction to social developments, to a possible new phase of the modernization process: the coming of a globalised, post-industrial multicultural world society.

Populism instigates itself mainly as an aversion to the notion that the future will be a post-national, globalised, multicultural future, based on market flexibility and dynamics. This aversion becomes even more reactionary even more so since it is often the case the the aforementioned future is being communicated as the only alternative: TINA: There is No alternative. This is the only possible future for countries such as Germany, Denmark, or even for Europe at large to survive in the new global world.

In the process of reform and adaptation to the new global world order, there has been a fundamental breakdown of trust between the elites and the general population, creating a harsh cleavage between winners and losers of the new modernization, a cleavage between future-optimists and future-pessimists.

A new dividing line is emerging between two groups: those who embrace the future and those who fear the future, people who believe that the new world holds nothing good in store for them and who feel betrayed by the ‘political elite’. This concerns both a cultural-political cleavage as well as a social-economic class divide. On the right this new dividing line creates a breeding ground for anti-immigrant, right-wing populist parties; on the left it provides a basis for more traditional or left-wing populist parties. Moreover, European social democratic parties are faced with an existential issue as both of these political tendencies are usually engulfed within their electorate.

The process of economic and cultural modernization results in a new social polarization between winners and losers. Major economic changes associated with globalization and new technologies do not have the same effect on everybody. Instead, they result in the redistribution of opportunities for participation and there are both successes and losses for the different participants. The level of education in particular, pre-determines individuals’ life-chances, their confidence in politics and public institutions and their future expectations.

It’s my strong conviction that progressives in the long run have the task to construct a greater collective permeated by social solidarity and common goals and method. This solidarity and belonging; a bridge between cultures and ethnic groups must be pursued not in the name of outdated and naive political correctness, but because it is the only way to maintain some form of welfarism. The historic mission of social democracy is to start the emancipation process all over again. There is no other way.

The price to pay for these noble ideals and ambitions is to abandon the concept of the multicultural society. That’s a hard choice to make, but I think that the concept of multiculturalism has caused a lot of harm and confusion, both for migrants and for the citizens of the host country – this is especially the case with the Netherlands. The ‘’investment in emancipation’’ plan, to which I referred to above, has a serious case of realisation only if there is a fundamental trade-off between migrants and native inhabitants in terms of a full and loyal orientation at the host country by migrants at the one hand, and acceptance of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious future for the hosts. Such an eventuality, however, is opposed by most advocacies of multiculturalism.

So, in the post-Fortuyn Netherlands there has been a radical change of tack from subsidised multiculturalism to mandatory integration and ‘citizenship’ measures (language and elementary cultural education), with retrospective effect for ‘oldcomers’ – immigrants of the first generation who have been living here for a long time. (René Cuperus, ‘From Polder Model to Postmodern Populism. Five Explanations for the ‘’Fortuyn Revolt’’ in The Challenge of Diversity)

The signals are set for more integration, for more obligatory co-existence between autochthonous and immigrant residents. The patterns of segregation in education (the Netherlands has traditionally applied confessional education and thus has Islamic schools), housing and social contacts are increasingly causing concern in areas where they continue to result in above-average unemployment, school truancy and crime. These statistics are generating more and more tension between solidarity and diversity and in theory form a threat to the sustainability of the European welfare state model, with its delicate balance between horizontal and vertical solidarity.

Even Islamic fundamentalist terrorism can have the perverse positive side-effect that, simply for reasons of state security and citizen safety, there are increased calls for mutual approach and cooperation between immigrant communities and the autochthonous population.

In short, there is a great and increasing urgency for an anti-segregation offensive, against living back to back, against separated parallel societies, leaving intact the ‘multicultural society’ in the private sphere (as long as it is compatible with the laws of constitutional liberal democracy), but urgently looking for ways to marry ethnic and cultural diversity with a common national identity. “The biggest question in all modern Europe is how majorities can express their local and national identities without alienating minorities? How can outsiders be made to feel at home without making insiders feel that they have become strangers in their own home?” (David Goodhart, ‘Britain’s Glue’, in The New Egalitarism, p. 170)

There is a growing need for a uniting, bridging national identity, a bigger Us. This is required for ‘majority reassurance’ and for the social acceptance and socio-economic success of immigrants (David Goodhart, οp.cit.). How could European countries pretend to differ from the experience of historical immigration like the United States of America, where the umbrella of American (political-cultural) identity is a prerequisite for successful integration and where patriotism produces a sense of belonging across ethnic and cultural heritage?

Viewed thus, the concept of national identity as a replacement for multiculturalism can be both a problem and a solution. It is a dangerous term in the closed, xenophobic, ethnocentric variant; but in the open, tolerant variant – such as the Dutch one – it can promote supra-ethnic community formation and solidarity as well as social, colour-blind cohesion.

The migration of highly skilled labour à la cosmopolitan London is essential for a creative economy such as in the Netherlands, but broad public support for this can only arise (again) if we become really clear about what integration is and what it is not; about the boundaries, rights and obligations of ‘fellow citizenship’ and if the process falls into line with what the great majority of the host citizens see as fair, civilised and reasonable. The final goal could well be “assimilation with retention of one’s own cultural identity”: “hyphenated immigrants“, so to speak, comparable to the United States of America-experience. This is, by the way, relatively much easier in the United Kingdom, with its umbrella identity of Britishness, related both to the Commonwealth as well as the English-speaking world, than in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark or Germany! (Stephen Howe, ‘Britishness and Multiculturalism’ στο The Challenge of Diversity)

The Netherlands is obliged by its history (Holocaust, apartheid) to be an open, cosmopolitan, non-racial society – but then preferably one not based on closed ethnic-traditional communities, but rather on individual citizenship, irrespective of ethnicity and religion. There is a non-racial understanding of national identity in the Netherlands – the Afro-Dutch from the former colonies (Surinamese, Antilleans) are mostly well-integrated. Things are more difficult with the population of 1.0. Million Muslims, mainly Moroccans and Turks, whose full integration is still unachieved – due in part to marriage-based immigration and family formation. These groups often originate from traditional rural areas with a large cultural and religious gap between them and the progressive-libertarian culture of the Netherlands (research shows that xenophobic sentiments in the Netherlands are held by highly educated women and homosexuals in larger towns and cities who are afraid of the discriminating intolerance of the Muslim immigrants).

Multiculturalism may even be considered the ideology of segregation. This points at the core problem that multicultural segregation through collective group formation along ethnic, cultural or religious lines is strongly at odds with the model of a Western, emancipated, individualised society, where individuals are not for ever ‘overlapping’ with their ethnic and cultural traditional communities. One of the main battlegrounds between western culture and non-western culture, the clash between individualism and traditional collectivism, is ill-addressed by the concept of multiculturalism, to put it mildly. Is multiculturalism in its final consequences not the ideology of apartheid?

Moreover, if multicultural segregation, despite all theory, results practically in ghettos of the deprived, for European social democracy these must surely be an intolerable cultural and socio-economic scandal, to be prevented by all means.

This essay examined the unease and popular distrust with particular reference to the issue of threatened national identity. In dealing with the theme of national identity I ventured into tricky terrain, certainly for centre-left progressives who mostly prefer to sing a post-national cosmopolitan and laconic multiculturalist melody. National identity is understood in a broad sense, because it seems typically European that it is precisely the social model of the post-war welfare state and the social market economy which form a substantial part of the positive self-image of various European populations. The unease is to be found in the perception of threat and undermining of national characteristics through processes of internationalisation: on the one hand the globalisation of production of goods and services as well as capital markets and the apparently boundless European unification, and on the other hand a seemingly uncontrollable immigration and the development of multi-ethnic societies with problems of integration, segregation and multicultural ‘confusion’. Research is showing that immigration, except for Britain until 2005, has become the most salient and much polarising issue since the 1970s. In some euroscepticical countries (Switzerland, Britain and, of lately, the Netherlands), the question of European unification is also part of the new political-cultural conflict. According to a recent report, this cultural dimension has become the primary basis on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobilize their electorate.

Contrary to the gospel of the ultra-modern pundits who advocate the self-abolition of the nation state in favour of new regional power centres, unstable and dislocating undercurrents in European society require not only prudence in modernisation and innovation, but also the rehabilitation of and return to the nation state as a forum for restoration of trust and as a source of social cohesion between the less and the better educated, between immigrants and the autochthonous population. A restoration of trust between politicians and citizens will have to take place at the national level, as will the creation of a harmonious multi-ethnic society. Europe must facilitate this process, and not obstruct it. In other words, the future of the EU, the European social model and a harmonious multi-ethnic society lies with the nation state.

Special issue: social democracy
Tags: democracy, migrants, multiculturalism, populism, religion, rene-cuperus