Nathan Young – A return to the commons? Why the environment (still) matters in democratic theory

The re-emergence of the ideal of environmental commons after centuries of privatization and centralization is a highly significant development, says Nathan Young. It is important to recognize, however, that this movement often proceeds in conjunction with the consolidation of exclusive authority in other respects.

As the content of this special issue attests, there is renewed interest in the notion of the commons. Much of this interest is driven by a desire to understand the social and political role of new technologies, such as the Internet, that dramatically extend capacities for collective and individual action. Consequently, this literature tends to investigate questions of autonomy and self-governance, but also issues of privatization and state control in these domains. There is a strong sense in these writings that the electronic commons stand at the forefront of a re-articulation between private and public spheres – that we are in the midst of a ‘great sorting out’ in terms of rights, particularly in terms of the dynamic between mechanisms of control (property rights, regulation, surveillance) and the rights of commonality, open-access, and self-governance.

The commons and environmental thought

However, these same themes and questions continue to play out with respect to that ‘older’ commons, namely the environment. These parallels are not merely academic. The same questions of power, identity, autonomy, and democracy permeate both the environmental and electronic commons. In this essay, I suggest that study of the electronic and environmental commons have much to gain from one another, as the ongoing (and heretofore mostly independent) debates within these spheres reflect very similar and fundamental questions about autonomy and governance in free societies.

The question of ‘the commons’ is an old one in environmental thought. Ostrom traces the modern debate about both the promise and the “tragedy” of the commons to Malthus and Hobbes, who articulated the dangers inherent in the collision of freedom and scarcity. These themes have been famously re-presented in Hardin’s article “The Tragedy of the Commons”, where he argues that the commons are inherently unsustainable in conditions of freedom and open-access, as it is in individual users’ best interests to exploit the commons to the overall deterioration of common benefits.

The duality of state policies

The core difference between the notions of the environmental and electronic commons is that the former assumes that scarcity is the rule, while the latter assumes that the commons are greatly enhanced with ever greater participation and openness. In what ways, then, are they relevant to one another? My answer is two-fold. The first reason is that state and corporate responses to the ‘older’ issue of environmental commons have set the framework for current responses to the ‘newer’ electronic commons. For instance, ideas about ‘the tragedy of the environmental commons’ have long steered governments in two directions of profound significance for democratic theory and practice. First, it has been used as a justification for the worldwide movement to privatize environment and resources. The notion of ‘private stewardship’ of the environment is etched upon contemporary notions of democracy – as vast tracts of property and wealth have been set ‘off limits’ from (official) public contestation. The second direction has involved the establishment of authoritarian, top-down, and hierarchical legal controls over access and usage of the commons, often despite the prior existence of local systems to mediate these same concerns. As the burgeoning literature on the electronic commons illustrates, these remain the two great narratives in ‘official’ responses to commons old and new.

The second reason that environmental and electronic commons are relevant to one another because both are currently in a state of flux. In this respect, scholars of the electronic commons should take note that the privatization-centralization paradigm that has anchored Western environmental governance for centuries appears to be shifting. Specifically, there is currently a significant movement underway to restore, in very selective and limited ways, the notion of locally-regulated environmental commons. This movement is evident in increasingly common efforts in many countries to establish “cooperative” management of local fisheries , in the notion of “community forestry” that has found particular purchase in North America and Asia , and in efforts to re-open lands as agricultural “commonage” in Australia and South Africa . It is my argument, however, that while these developments are undoubtedly driven by commitments to the principles of the commons (such as autonomy and self-governance), they are also couched in larger movements of globalization and neo-liberalism. I contend that these forces, with their attendant pressures for ‘efficiency’ in economy and governance, are recasting the commons – extending exclusionary authority in some respects while creating new ‘islands’ of local autonomy in others.

The case of British Columbia

To illustrate, I use of an example from my home country of Canada, specifically the province of British Columbia (BC). The economy of BC has traditionally been resource-based with a strong emphasis on forestry, fisheries, and mining. Moreover, the BC case is relevant because the province continues to hold resource rights “in common” (94% of BC’s land-base is designated as “Crown lands”, meaning that ownership rests with the province). This arrangement has meant that BC’s Crown lands have traditionally been very tightly controlled by central authorities, who then lease access rights to private firms. Indeed, in extending this centralized control over these commons, the provincial government severely restricted access rights of Aboriginal groups and other traditional users .

Small but significant measures have recently been taken against this regime. On the pretext of enhancing global competitiveness, the provincial government has given up much of its authority over access rights. Importantly, devolution has occurred in two directions. On the one hand, the rights of corporate lessees have been enhanced, to the point where firms are allowed to trade access rights, to self-regulate on environmental issues, and to abandon territorial commitments (i.e., to process resources in the region of harvest). On the other hand, senior governments have sought to mitigate the impact of these changes on resource-dependent communities by carving out new commons. Specifically, the provincial government aims to redistribute 20% of Crown lands to community groups and Aboriginal governments. These areas come under direct local control, with local groups (tellingly labelled “community corporations”) regulating access to the lease, as well as the sales of materials to local and extra-local processors. The system allows significant flexibility to the local corporations, with some choosing to follow the model of larger firms and others choosing a more cooperative route.

A new commons?

The movement towards ‘new’ commons is occurring across many regions of the globe. It is important to recognize, however, that as with the BC case these often proceed in conjunction with the consolidation of exclusive authority in other respects. Other important examples of this tendency include the Bush administration’s significant expansion of community forest programs on public lands in conjunction with radical reductions in environmental regulations of industry as a whole, as well as state efforts across North America, Europe, and Asia to encourage further capitalization in commercial fisheries at the same moment that governments pursue ‘cooperative management’.

This tendency is important for new discussions of the ‘electronic commons’ and for democratic theory more generally. First, it is telling that even the most rigid regulatory frameworks change and evolve with their political-economic context. The re-emergence of the ideal of environmental commons after centuries of privatization and centralization is a highly significant development. Second, however, it is also important to recognize the strategic aspect of these “returns to the commons”, as it is increasingly common for governments to devolve to community and to corporate actors in the same moment – to establish limited spaces for commons autonomy within the context of enhanced corporate rights to further enclose other (and larger) spaces. This, in my opinion, will be the next big front in the struggle over electronic commons – to ensure that the open spaces are large and not sequestered, central and not peripheral.

Further links

Environmental commons

British Columbia treaty commission on aboriginal rights

Special issue: commons, recent articles
Tags: Canada, commons, ecology, nathan young